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Abstract—With technology scaling, lower supply voltages, and
higher operating frequencies clock distribution networks become
more and more vulnerable to transients faults. These faults can
cause circuit-wide effects and thus, significantly contribute to
the functional failure rate of the circuit. This paper proposes a
methodology to analyse how the functional behaviour is affected
by Single-Event Transients in the clock distribution network.
The approach is based on logic-level simulation and thus, only
uses the register-transfer level description of a design. Therefore,
a fault model is proposed which implements the main effects
due to radiation-induced transients in the clock network. This
fault model enables the computation of the functional failure
rate caused by Single-Event Transients for each individual clock
buffer, as well as the complete network. Further, it allows the
identification of the most vulnerable flip-flops related to Single-
Event Transients in the clock network.
The proposed methodology is applied in a practical example
and a fault injection campaign is performed. In order to evaluate
the impact of Single-Event Transients in clock distribution
networks, the obtained functional failure rate is compared to
the error rate caused by Single-Event Upsets in the sequential
logic.
Index Terms—Functional Failure Rate, Functional De-Rating,
Single-Event Effect, Single-Event Transient, Single-Event Upset,
Clock Tree Network
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s reliability standards and customers’ expectations
set tough targets for the quality of electronic devices and
systems. Among other reliability threats, transient faults, such
as Single-Event Upsets (SEUs) in sequential/state logic and
Single-Event Transients (SETs) in combinatorial logic, are
known to contribute significantly to the overall failure rate
of the system, possibly exceeding the set reliability targets.
As an example, standard flip-flops and SRAM memories,
manufactured in relatively recent technologies (down to the
latest CMOS bulk processes) exhibit error rates of hundreds
of FITs (events per a billion working hours per megabit) [1],
[2]. Complex circuits using such cells can easily overshoot
the by ISO 26262 mandated 10 FIT target for an automotive
ASIL D application.
Circuits’ susceptibility to transient faults/single events is
caused by faults occurring in the circuit’s cells and their
subsequent propagation in the system, possibly causing ob-
servable effects (failures) at the system level. The impact of
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Single-Event Upsets and Single-Event Transients in individual
state and combinatorial cells has been extensively studied
and for many applications, is the leading contributor to the
overall event rate exhibited by the circuit. However, due to
technology scaling, lower supply voltages and higher operating
frequencies, other circuit features such as the clock distribu-
tion network (CDN), reset circuitry, etc. become also more
vulnerable to transient faults [3]–[6] and could cause circuit-
wide effects that are more difficult to mitigate and to correct.
Indeed, clock buffers from the clock distribution networks
have a high fan-out and very few masking mechanism; Single-
Event Transients occurring in these cells can potentially reach
many sequential cells and state elements and thus, significantly
contribute to the overall functional failure rate.
A. Objective of Our Methodology
So far, only few works studied the impact of SETs in
clock networks. To determine the sensitivity of clock buffer
cells to these events, some studies performed accelerated
radiation tests of dedicated test chips [5], [7]. Other approaches
computed a static failure rate by performing circuit simulation
on the electrical-level and thus, obtaining the Electrical De-
Rating per clock buffer, as well as the upset rate of the
sequential logic due to SETs in the clock network. This
upset rate was combined with the functional failure rate due
to SEUs in the sequential logic obtained from a SEU fault
injection campaign [8], [9]. However, their SET fault injection
simulations used only static inputs and thus do not reflect any
dynamic behaviour during the runtime of the circuit. Hence,
[10] extended this method by injecting SETs in the clock
distribution network during a dynamic electrical simulation
and thus, obtaining the faulty latching activity of the sequential
logic.
Nonetheless, the previous work does not analyse the impact
of SETs on the functional behaviour of the circuit and further-
more, they are all based on electrical simulations. Since the
complexity of today’s circuits is increasing, a dynamic simu-
lation of the full circuit on the electrical level is not feasible
anymore. Thus, contrary to the previous work, the proposed
fault model in this paper is based on logic-level simulation and
only requires the register transfer level description of a design.
This enables a faster analysis of the circuit. The proposed
method is evaluated by applying it on a practical example and
performing a fault injection campaign.
B. Organisation of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II summarises the definition of Single-Event Effects and
the different de-rating mechanism and relates them to the
context of SETs in the clock distribution networks. The pro-
posed methodology and dedicated fault model are described
in section III. In section IV the proposed method is validated
on a practical example and the functional failure rate for each
clock buffer and the whole network are computed. Further,
the most vulnerable flip-flops related to transients in the clock
network are identified. Section V rounds off this paper by
giving concluding remarks as well as prospects for future
work.
II. SINGLE-EVENT EFFECT MECHANISM WITH REGARD
TO CLOCK DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
Erroneous data in one of the memory or logic points of
a circuit can be produced by the propagation of a Single-
Event Transient (SET) or Single-Event Upset (SEU). SETs
are the result of the collection of charge deposited by ionising
particles on combinatorial logic cells. SEUs are the change of
the logic state of a discrete sequential element, such as a latch,
a flip flop or a memory cell.
In the data path between flip-flops, four de-rating mecha-
nisms [11], [12] significantly reduce the impact of SETs and
SEUs on the effective error rate.
Electrical De-Rating (EDR): The transient is filtered due to
pulse narrowing and or an increase of the rise and fall
time during its propagation. By the time it reaches the
end of the path, either it has been completely filtered or
the voltage transition is below the switching threshold.
Temporal De-Rating (TDR): The erroneous state reaches
the input of a flip-flop but outside the latching window,
thus it is not sampled.
Logical De-Rating (LDR): The erroneous state is prevented
from propagating due to the state on another controlling
input of a gate such as a zero value on an AND2 gate.
Functional De-Rating (FDR): The erroneous state is con-
sidered at an applicative level. This means even when
an SEU/SET does propagate (e.g. is not logically or
temporally masked), the impact at the function of the
circuit can vary, and in many cases is benign. Thus,
considering the faults at an applicative level, the de-rating
depends on the criteria defining the acceptable behaviour
of the circuit during the execution of an application and
the fault classifications (correctable, uncorrectable, not
detected by the hardware but detected by the software,
if a retry is possible, if there is a time limit to receive the
correct result, etc.)
These structural de-ratings mechanism are used to evaluate
the probability of the propagation of a fault during the clock
cycle of their occurrence. They are usually estimated by using
probabilistic algorithms and simulation based approaches.
For a transient in a clock distribution network (CDN),
the Logical De-Rating and Temporal De-Rating is limited.
Potentially, an SET may be logically masked by a clock gating
cells or an enable pin of a flip-flop. Temporal De-Rating is
limited as the clock input of the flip-flop is by definition
asynchronous.
In [13] two main effects are identified due to transients
in the clock network: radiation-induced jitter and radiation-
induced race. Jitter occurs if an transient causes the clock edge
to move forward or backward causing a timing violation. A
race condition occurs if a transient causes a flip-flop that is
closed to become open allowing data to “race” through to the
next stage.
The objective of this paper is to present a methodology to
compute the functional failure rate of a circuit with regards to
Single-Event Transients in the clock network. Therefore, the
described radiation-induced effects are implemented in a fault
model based on logic-level simulation which is presented in
the next section.
III. METHODOLOGY
To analyse how the functional behaviour is affected by SETs
in the clock distribution network (CDN), the main radiation-
induced effects are implemented in a fault model. In order
to cope with the complexity of today’s circuits the proposed
fault model is based on logic-level simulation, which enables
a faster analysis than simulations based on the electrical level.
By using this fault model in a fault simulation campaign the
functional failure rate for each clock buffer and the whole
network can be calculated. Further, the vulnerability of the
sequential logic in relation to these events can be computed.
A. Fault Model
The proposed fault model which implements effects of
Single-Event Transients propagating along the clock network
is illustrated in Fig. 1a. It is based on logic-level simulations
and thus, only uses the register-transfer level (RTL) description
of a design. To emulate the SET in the clock network, first,
a clock buffer is selected as injection target. Second, all flip-
flops which are connected to the end-point of the selected
clock buffer are identified. Then, during the RTL simulation,
for each identified flip-flop, the corresponding signal values at
the flip-flop output are modified at the injection time. The SET
induced clock pulse is imitated by copying the signal value
from the flip-flop input signal Din to its output signal Qout
as shown in Fig. 1b. Thus, only flip-flops which would have
changed their state in the following clock cycle are impacted
by the transient and others remain unchanged (as shown in
Fig. 1c).
The proposed fault model does not take any electrical or
timing behaviour into account and thus, is representing a worst
case scenario. However, it can be combined with measured
cross-sections of the clock buffer cells obtained during radi-
ation experiments, as shown in [7], or Electrical De-Rating
factors obtained from electrical level simulations (without
taking the runtime behaviour into account) as described in [
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Fig. 1. Proposed fault model for Single-Event Transients in clock distribution
networks based on logic level simulation
B. Virtual Clock Network
The proposed method relies on the RTL model of a design.
Typically, These models do not provide a clock distribution
network. In general, the clock network is obtained by perform-
ing a clock network synthesis during the physical design stage
of a chip. In this paper this step is simplified by generating
a virtual clock network. The generation of a virtual clock
network enables an analysis of the circuit in earlier design
stages with regard to clock network issues (such as SETs) and
allows the evaluation of different clock network features, such
as the fan-out, layout or topology. In fact, recent work has
shown that topology and gate load play a significant role in
the overall SET sensitivity of clock networks [14].
In the most common implementation of clock distribution
networks buffers are inserted either at the clock source and/or
along the clock path, forming a tree structure. Thereby, the
most used topology of the networks is the symmetric H-tree
which can be also seen as a binary tree topology [15] (as
illustrated in Fig. 1a). This network can be generated in a
recursive manner: The root clock buffer (stage 1) is assigned
to the full set of available flip-flops. The second stage has
two clock buffers which are driven by the buffer of the first
stage. The full set of flip-flops is split in two disjoint sets
with half the size and assigned to the two different clock
buffers. For the next stage of clock buffers these sets are again
divided in half and assigned to separated clock buffers which
are driven by clock buffers of the previous stage. This process
is repeated until the defined minimum fan-out of the clock
buffer is reached. The example shown in Fig. 1a consists of a
set of 9 flip-flops and a minimum fan-out of 2 which results in
3 levels of clock buffer. Due to the uneven number of flip-flops
the actual fan-out of the clock buffer ranges from 2 to 3.
C. Fault Injection Simulation Campaign
With the previous described fault model a logic-level sim-
ulation based fault injection campaign can be performed.
Therefore, the RTL model of the considered design and a
testbench is needed. The testbench allows to verify the correct
behaviour of the circuit. This can be done, for example, by
monitoring and recording all outputs of the circuit. The record
can be used as the golden reference and any difference is
considered as a functional failure.
In the fault injection campaign faults are injected into the
clock buffers of the clock network at a random point in time
according to the described fault model. During each fault
injection the changed and unchanged flip-flops are captured
and stored. After the injection, the simulation is continued.
The circuit output is monitored during the whole simulation
and compared to the golden reference. If, according to the
monitored output, no failure on the functional level was
noted, the injected fault was masked and the correct function
is verified. If the functional behaviour is different to the
reference, the fault is considered as a functional failure. Thus,
the Functional De-Rating factor of SETs in a clock buffer
and the complete clock network can be computed. Further, by
tracking the flip-flop changes which lead to a functional failure
the vulnerability of the sequential logic can be calculated and
thus, the most vulnerable flip-flops can be identified. This
information can provide guidelines to the circuit designer
to improve robustness of the clock distribution network. For
example, techniques for selectively harden the most critical
clock buffers are shown in [6] and [16]. Further, the ∆-TMR
technique can be used which hardens the sequential logic
against SEUs, but also introduces delays into the data path
in such a way the logic is protected against SETs in the clock
signal [17].
IV. FAULT INJECTION CAMPAIGN
In this section the presented methodology and implemented
fault model is shown on a practical example. Therefore, the
circuit under test and the corresponding testbench is described.
Afterwards, the functional failure rate for each clock buffer and
for the complete network is computed. Additionally, the most
vulnerable flip-flops related to SETs in the clock distribution
network (CDN) are identified.
A. Test Circuit, Testbench and Clock Distribution Network
For this case-study the Ethernet 10GE MAC Core from
OpenCores is used. The circuit implements the Media Access
Control (MAC) functions for 10Gbps operation as defined
in the IEEE 802.3ae standard. The 10GE MAC core has a
10Gbps interface (XGMII TX/RX) to connect it to different
types of Ethernet PHYs and one packet interface to transmit
and receive packets to/from the user logic [18]. The circuit
consists of control logic, state machines, FIFOs and memory
interfaces. It is implemented at the Register-Transfer Level
(RTL) and is publicly available on OpenCores.
The corresponding testbench writes several packets to the
10GE MAC transmit packet interface. As packet frames be-
come available in the transmit FIFO, the MAC calculates a
CRC and sends them out to the XGMII transmitter. The XG-
MII TX interface is looped-back to the XGMII RX interface
in the testbench. The frames are thus processed by the MAC
receive engine and stored in the receive FIFO. Eventually, the
testbench reads frames from the packet receive interface and
prints out the results [18]. During the simulation all sent and
received packages to and from the core are monitored and
recorded. This record is used as the golden reference for the
fault injection campaign.
By performing a simple logic translation of the design,
1233flip-flops have been identified and matched with the
corresponding RTL signal names. One virtual clock network
was generated which groups flip-flops together according to
their signal names and connects them to the same clock buffer.
Additionally, 50 virtual clock networks were generated which
connect the flip-flops to randomly selected clock buffers. The
clock networks have a minimum fan-out of 16 flip-flops, which
results in 7 stages and a total of 127 buffers with an actual
fan-out from 19-20 flip-flops.
B. Results for SETs in the Clock Distribution Network
A fault injection campaign was performed to analyse the
functional failure rate of SETs in the clock distribution net-
work (CDN). Therefore, 170 SETs were injected in each of
the 127 clock buffer of the different virtual clock networks.
The faults were injected only during the active phase of the
simulation, when packets are sent and received through the
user packet interface.
The overall results of the SET fault injection campaign are
summarized in Table I and Table II. Table I presents the results
for the clock distribution network (CDN) which groups and
connects flip-flops together based on their signal names. The
number of reached, changed and unchanged flip-flops are listed
for the entire campaign as well as the averaged number per
injection. Further, the number of injections which lead to a
functional failure is shown. Table II presents the results for
the same metrics but averaged over the 50 different random
virtual clock networks. It was noted that the values for changed
and unchanged values are identical. This can be explained
by the fact that the pseudo random number generator always
generates the same values to determine the injection time for
each fault injection campaign. Thus, for each campaign the
faults are injected at the same injection times and reaching the
same flip-flops (via different buffers) which results in the same
state changes. However, the functional failure rate is varying
among the different random clock networks and especially in
comparison to the not random clock network the functional
failure rate differs by a factor of 2.
TABLE I
SET FAULT INJECTION CAMPAIGN RESULTS FOR CDN WITH FLIP-FLOPS
GROUPED TOGETHER BASED ON THE SIGNAL NAME
Total Per Injection
Injection Targets (Clock Buffers) 127 -
Injected Faults (SET) 21590 -
Reached FFs 1467270 67.96
Changed FF States 113008 5.23
Unchanged FF States 1354262 62.73
Functional Failure 5423 25.12%
TABLE II
SET FAULT INJECTION CAMPAIGN RESULTS FOR CDN WITH RANDOMLY
GROUPED FLIP-FLOPS (AVERAGED OVER 50 CDNS)
Total Per Injection
Injection Targets (Clock Buffers) 127 -
Injected Faults (SET) 21590 -
Reached FFs 1467270 67.96
Changed FF States 113008 5.23
Unchanged FF States 1354262 62.73
Functional Failure (averaged) 11316 (± 99) 52.41% (± 0.46%)
The most vulnerable flip-flops to SETs in the clock network
are obtained by tracking the flip-flops which were reached
and consequently changed their state due to an injected event
and thus, led to a functional failure. Fig 2 shows the most
critical 5% of the flip-flops for one of the randomly created
clock networks, ranked by the individual functional failure
rate. In case of selective mitigation these flip-flops should be
considered for hardening with the ∆-TMR technique [17].
C. Results for SEUs in the Sequential Logic
The functional failure rate caused by SEUs in the flip-flops
is obtained by a classical full flat statistical fault injection
campaign. The SEU is emulated by modifying the stored value
of a flip-flop at a random point in time during the simulation.
Similar to the SET fault injection campaign, any difference in
the send or received packages is considered as a functional
failure of the application.
For the campaign 170 SEUs were injected in each of
the 1233 flip-flops. 57150 of the injected faults showed a
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Fig. 2. Most vulnerable flip-flops due to SETs in the CDN
functional failure, which corresponds to an Functional De-
Rating factor of 27.26%. Table III summarizes the overall
results of the SEU fault injection campaign. In Fig 3 the
most sensitive 5% of the flip-flops are listed, ranked by the
individual functional failure rate. This list is compared to the
most vulnerable flip-flops due to SETs in the clock network
in the next section.
TABLE III
SEU FAULT INJECTON CAMPAIGN RESULTS FOR THE SEQUENTIAL LOGIC
Total Per Injection
Injection Targets (FFs) 1233 -
Injected Faults (SEU) 209610 -
Functional Failure 57150 27.26%
D. Comparison and Discussion
In order to compare the most vulnerable flip-flops related
to SETs in the clock network, for each virtual clock network
a list is created which contains the most critical 5% of the
flip-flops, ranked by the functional failure rate. Comparing
these lists to each other, it has been noted that there is a big
overlap of flip-flops. Each lists contains 60 flip-flops (the most
critical 5%) and the same 42 flip-flops can be found in each
list, which results in an overlap of 70%. In contrary, when
comparing the most vulnerable flip-flops related to SETs in
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Fig. 3. Most vulnerable flip-flops due to SEUs in the sequential logic
the clock network to the flip-flops related to SEUs almost
no overlap can be found (3 flip-flops are common in each
list which results in an overlap of 5%). This is particularly
important when selective hardening of the sequential logic is
considered. For example, if there is a limited budget which can
be used to harden flip-flops by using the ∆-TMR technique,
different flip-flops need to be taken into account in order to
lower the functional failure rate related to both effects.
Furthermore, the functional failure rate due to SEUs in the
sequential logic is compared to the error rate due to SETs in
the clock network. Therefore, Table IV summarizes the aver-
age Functional De-Rating factor per element. The Functional
De-Rating factors are in the same order of magnitude but
can be twice as much depending on the layout of the clock
network. However, the number of sequential elements is 10
times higher and thus, the SEUs in flip-flops are the leading
contributor to the overall functional failure rate of the circuit.
Considering further physical effects the Functional De-
Rating factor can be combined with a FIT rate obtained from
a characterized standard cell library. In [19] FIT values for the
NanGate FreePDK45 Open Cell Library [20] were obtained by
using dedicated tools and results from radiation testing. The
average values for D-Flip-Flops and clock buffers show that
the FIT value for the sequential logic is about 3 times higher,
which further lowers the effect of SETs in the clock network.
Nonetheless, if a fully SEU hardened circuit is considered,
the Functional De-Rating of the sequential logic is lower.
Depending on the implementation of the hardened cells, the
sensitivity is usually about one order of magnitude lower than
the one of un-hardened cells. Taking this into account, the
Functional De-Rating factor would is lowered by the same
amount and thus, the functional failure rates getting closer to
the failure rates due to SETs. This would mean that the SETs
in the clock network are almost as significant as SEUs in the
sequential logic.
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE RATE ANALYSIS
OF THE 10GE MAC CIRCUIT
Element Type
Number
of Elements
Average
FDR FIT
Functional
Failure
Rate
Flip-Flops 1233 0.27 161.75 53848
Clock Network 127 0.25 59.17 1878
Random Clock Network 127 0.52 59.17 3907
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a methodology to analyse how Single-
Event Transients (SETs) in the clock distribution network are
impacting the functional behaviour of a circuit. A methodol-
ogy and a fault model were presented which implement the
main radiation-induced effects in clock networks. The method
enables the computation of the functional failure rate in a
logic-level simulation based on the register-transfer level of
the design. Thus, a faster evaluation can be performed than
by simulating on the electrical level.
The approach was applied in a practical example. SETs were
injected into the clock network of the circuit under test in
a fault injection campaign. Thus, the functional failure rates
of the clock network and the individual clock buffers were
determined. Further, the most vulnerable flip-flops have been
identified, which can be considered for selective mitigation
techniques.
The proposed method uses a Virtual Clock Network which
has the advantage that different clock network features can
be evaluated with regard to Single-Event Effects in the clock
network in an early design stage. However, the presented
method can also be used in later design stages when the real
clock network is available. This remains a topic for future
work. In this paper two different types of clock network
layouts were created. It has been noted that the layout can have
a significant impact on the functional failure rate. Therefore,
for future work further layouts and topologies of real clock
distribution networks should be evaluated.
Finally, the functional failure rate due to SETs in the clock
network has been compared to SEUs in the sequential logic.
It was noted that there is almost no overlap looking at the
most critical flip-flops. Further, the discussion has shown that
the contribution of SETs in the clock network can be quite
significant, if the circuit’s sequential logic is only hardened
against SEUs.
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